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1. Introduction
It is often thought that metarepresentation is a particularly sophisticated
cognitive achievement. There is substantial evidence that dolphins and some
primates can represent some of their own psychological states, but the ex-
istence of ‘metacognition’ in any other species remains highly controversial
(Carruthers 2009; Hampton 2009; Smith 2009). Research on the extent to
which humans metacognize their own psychological states is expanding in
parallel (Fleming et al. forthcoming). Representing the mental states of oth-
ers is believed to be even rarer or non-existent in non-human animals (Hare
et al. 2001; Heyes 1998). That capacity, under the label ‘theory of mind’,
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was long thought to be a crucial and relatively late developmental transi-
tion even in humans (Leslie 1987; Perner et al. 1989; Wimmer and Perner
1983). Recent looking-time experiments suggesting infants have an ability to
track others’ perceptions and beliefs at a very young age raise the possibility
that infants have some lower-level capacity for mentalizing (Kova´cs et al.
2010; Onishi and Baillargeon 2005; Surian et al. 2007), in which case they
may be able to metarepresent before they have a fully-fledged concept of
belief, desire, or any other psychological state (Apperly and Butterfill 2009).
However, macaques do not show the same behaviour (Marticorena et al.
2011) and there has been no suggestion that the capacity for non-conceptual
metarepresentation extends more widely than that.
This paper argues that non-conceptual metarepresentation does extend
much more widely, but based on a different set of considerations, located
in a field where the issue of metarepresentation has been overlooked: the
literature on reinforcement learning in reward-guided decision-making tasks.
Research on humans and other animals has produced an impressive body
of converging evidence that midbrain dopamine neurons produce a reward
prediction error signal (RPE) that is causally involved in choice behaviour
(Rushworth et al. 2009; Schultz et al. 1997; Schultz 1998). RPEs are found in
humans, primates, rodents and perhaps even insects (Claridge-Chang et al.
2009). This paper argues that RPEs carry metarepresentational contents.
A metarepresentation is a representation whose content concerns the
content of another representation. For the purposes of this paper, a non-
conceptual representation is a representation without semantically-significant
constituent structure. It follows that the use of a non-conceptual repre-
sentation does not require the possession of any concepts. RPEs are non-
conceptual representations, so there is no suggestion that deploying RPEs
involves having a theory of mind or having concepts of mental states. RPEs
are a more low-level form of representation, probably non-conscious,1 and
quite different from the kind of thinking about the mental states of ourselves
and others that is familiar from everyday experience. It is clear that the brain
does implement many forms of low-level information processing, beyond the
personal level representations that occur in the familiar stream of conscious
thought. For example, low-level non-conceptual information processing has
been found in some systems for perception and motor control.
Could a non-conceptual representation ever represent another represen-
tation as a representation? In one sense, no. It is natural to understand
‘representation-as’ so as to require deployment of a concept. A thought
represents Jane as a professor only if the thought includes the concept
PROFESSOR and predicates it of Jane. For a putative metarepresentation M
to represent another representation R as a representation (in this sense), M
must have a constituent that refers to the property of being a representation
(or some other representational property of R, like being a belief , having
a certain content or truth condition, referring to some particular, etc.). That
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is clearly ruled out since non-conceptual representations lack semantically-
significant constituent structure.
However, there is nothing in the idea of non-conceptual content that ex-
cludes representational properties from figuring in the correctness condition
or satisfaction condition of a non-conceptual representation. Just as for all
non-conceptual contents, such properties can figure in the correctness condi-
tion without there being a corresponding semantically-significant constituent
of the representation.2 Nevertheless, we can still discern a sense in which a
non-conceptual representation M might fail to represent another representa-
tion R as a representation: M might represent only vehicle properties of R.
For example, the correctness condition of M might be: such-and-such neu-
ral network is firing more strongly than normal; or the variance of the firing
rate of such-and-such neural assembly is high. If the neural assembly figur-
ing in the content is a representation R, then M is indeed about another
representation; but M does not represent R as a representation, since no
representational property of R figures in the content of M. On the other
hand, the correctness condition of M could concern the content of R, for
example: the current visual representation of the location of the light is likely to
be false. Then M would indeed represent R as a representation—in the sense
in which non-conceptual content admits of the distinction. Accordingly, M’s
having a correctness condition or satisfaction condition that concerns the
content of another representation is taken to be a sufficient condition for
M to be a metarepresentation. That is a reasonably stringent test. It is not
enough that M concerns another representation. A representational property
must figure in M’s correctness condition or satisfaction condition.
This paper argues that non-conceptual information processing is respon-
sible for the reward-guided decision-making that is elicited in certain simple
experimental paradigms; and that one element of this information process-
ing, the RPE signal, happens to have meta-level non-conceptual content.
Since the mechanism which deploys a phasic dopaminergic signal for rein-
forcement learning of reward-driven behaviour is widespread, it follows that
a form of non-conceptual metarepresentation is relatively common in the
animal kingdom. But the argument does not suggest that metarepresenta-
tion is ubiquitous. It is only because of particular features of the way RPEs
are generated and processed that an argument for metarepresentation can
be sustained. The argument is that the modelling and empirical findings
combine to produce good evidence for metarepresentation—the consider-
ations are evidential, not constitutive. No sufficient condition is proposed
which entails that a system contains metarepresentations. Nevertheless, these
evidential considerations may also apply to other systems in which the dif-
ference between a prediction and feedback is used to update the prediction
for the future (Friston 2010; Wolpert et al. 2011). However, the point does
not generalise to all comparator circuits, nor to all mechanisms for combin-
ing two sources of information (Ernst and Banks 2002). Nor is the model
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obviously applicable to the data on the seemingly metarepresentational look-
ing behaviour in infants mentioned above.
Section 2 below summarises the evidence that RPEs are involved in
reward-guided decision making. Section 3 shows that widely-accepted mod-
els of the information processing responsible for subjects’ choice behaviour
in these settings presuppose that RPEs carry metarepresentational contents.
That furnishes a prima facie reason to think that RPEs are metarepresen-
tational. Although the question of metarepresentation has not been can-
vassed in the RPE literature, it has been much discussed in the literature
on ‘metacognition’ in non-human animals. Section 4 examines strategies de-
ployed in the metacognition literature to displace a metarepresentational
reading. Those strategies can be used to test the claim that RPEs are
metarepresentational. Section 5 argues that the prima facie case that RPEs
are metarepresentational is not undermined by the arguments found in the
metacognition literature. Instead, the kinds of considerations advanced there,
together with a plausible framework for content attribution, add up to a posi-
tive argument that RPEs have metarepresentational contents. They have both
indicative and imperative contents (they are so-called pushmi-pullyus). The
indicative content is that the content of another representation—the agent’s
(first-order) representation of the reward that will be delivered on average
for performing a given action—differs from the current feedback, and by
how much. The imperative content instructs that it be revised upwards or
downwards proportionately.
2. Reward-Guided Decision Making
Experiments on reward-guided decision making ask subjects to choose be-
tween two or more options in order to receive probabilistic rewards. Subjects
typically choose between stimuli (e.g. one fractal pattern vs. another), or
between actions directly (e.g. left vs. right button press), or between actions
in the context of a stimulus. The rewards offered for each choice are not
wholly predictable, and the chance of each option being rewarded can vary.
For example, a monkey might have a 0.3 chance of receiving 0.7ml of juice if
it selects stimulus A, but a 0.7 chance of receiving 0.2ml of juice if it selects
stimulus B. The chances and payoffs might then change during the course of
the experiment. Human subjects are typically rewarded in money at the end
of the experiment.
How should subjects distribute their choices? Clearly the optimal strategy
is always to pick the option with the highest objective expected reward (=
chance x payoff). But subjects are not told what the chances are. Chances
must be inferred from feedback. Furthermore, the chances and payoffs as-
sociated with each option may change over time. So when a subject receives
an unexpected payoff, that may just be due to chance, it may be because
they have misrepresented the expected reward delivered by that option, or
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it may be that the probabilistic reward schedule has changed. A policy of
just choosing the option represented as having the highest expected reward
would be suboptimal, because it would not allow the subject to gather data
about the changing payoffs of other options.
Normative accounts have been developed that show how an agent ought
to distribute their choices in the light of a given history of reward. The term
‘model-based’ is used for solutions which work out the causal structure of
the system of interest and use it to predict what is going to happen next.
A simpler approach is just to keep a register of how valuable each available
option is on average, and to update that register in the light of the feedback
received on each trial. Solutions in that family, which do not require any
grasp of causal structure, are called ‘model-free’. A model-free decision-
making system estimates how much reward each available option will deliver
on average and updates those estimates through reinforcement learning based
on feedback. Many animals can use reinforcement learning to perform such
tasks successfully. Although humans could do it in other ways, the set up
we have just described, requiring a series of rapid responses for relatively
short-term rewards, encourages human subjects also to solve the task using
model-free reinforcement learning.
The problem of calculating the optimal way to behave in these settings
has long been studied by mathematical psychologists and computational
modellers (e.g. Bush and Mosteller 1951). A major breakthrough was the
discovery of the class of temporal difference (TD) algorithms. TD learning
can deal with cases where rewards only occur at the end of a series of choices.
They nevertheless distribute credit for the eventual reward to choices taken
earlier in the series, solving the so-called credit assignment problem (Sutton
and Barto 1998). While TD algorithms are undoubtedly fundamental to the
conspicuous success of reinforcement learning models of decision-making
and to understanding its neural basis, the philosophical questions about
metarepresentation arise in just the same way in cases where there is imme-
diate feedback for each choice. To keep the metarepresentation issue centre-
stage we will work with a pared-down model with immediate feedback. But
the argument for metarepresentation in no way turns on this simplification,
as is made clear in the Appendix.
TD learning models, including our simplified version, give a central role
to a reward prediction error that is calculated at each time-step. The RPE
is the difference between the average payoff expected at a time-step, given
the current stimulus/context/behavioural choice, and the reward received at
that time-step. Crucially, it is this prediction error, rather than the absolute
value of the feedback directly, that drives learning. The agent’s expectation
about the average reward that will be received in a context is revised upwards
or downwards in accordance with the size of this RPE.
RPEs started life as a feature of computational models designed for opti-
mal decision-making, without reference to how the problem is actually solved
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by humans or other animals. But then Wolfram Schultz and colleagues dis-
covered that midbrain dopamine neurons broadcast an RPE signal (Schultz
et al. 1997; Schultz 1998). Relative to a background tonic level of firing,
there is a transitory phasic increase when a unpredicted reward is delivered,
and a phasic decrease in firing when a predicted reward is not delivered. This
finding brought the computational modelling rapidly back into contact with
real psychology, galvanised the cognitive neuroscience of decision-making
and launched the science of neuroeconomics.
The strategy that has been so successful in this area is to use behavioural
and neural data in tandem to pin down the information processing involved.
Rival models are fitted to the behavioural data (the pattern of choices made
and rewards received) and compared in terms of how well they fit the data.
Models from the TD learning class often perform well. To find which brain
areas are responsible for implementing the different steps of the algorithm,
trial-by-trial variations in the quantities posited by the model are compared
with data reflecting neural activity, most commonly the fMRI BOLD signal.
The trick is to look for regions of the brain whose activity varies parametri-
cally in line with some quantity calculated over according to the model (e.g.
that shows a close quantitative match with the RPE posited by the model).
Such trial-by-trial correlations point to brain areas likely to be involved in
performing various steps of the algorithm.
Similarly, the patterns of neural firing obtained through single unit record-
ing can be correlated with quantities in the model like the RPE. Dopamin-
ergic neurons in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and substantia nigra pars
compacta have been found to have a firing profile corresponding to the
RPEs posited by TD learning models of appetitive conditioning (Bayer and
Glimcher 2005; Schultz et al. 1997; Schultz 1998). Applied to fMRI data,
the approach has found correlates of the RPE in the VTA (D’Ardenne et al.
2008), and in areas of the ventral striatum that receive dopaminergic inputs
(Haruno and Kawato 2006; McClure et al. 2003; O’Doherty et al. 2003).
This kind of data, together with a large range of converging evidence that
the measured neural activity is causally relevant to the observed behaviour,
has produced a substantial consensus about the mechanism that is responsi-
ble for decision-making, how it is neurally realised, and how to describe its
quantitative properties mathematically. Issues remain unresolved, of course,
for example over whether prediction errors concerning actions are calculated
in addition to or instead of reward prediction errors (Li et al. 2011). Dissent-
ing voices also remain that say the phasic dopamine signal does not function
as any kind of prediction error (Redgrave and Gurney 2006). But the current
state of the art is as strong a scientific consensus as a philosopher could
possibly hope for. So we can take it that TD learning models capture some-
thing true and important about a system of low-level representations found
in real brains, and that the phasic dopamine response is a prediction error
signal.
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Figure 1. Simplified Actor-Critic Model
3. Content in the Model
For the sake of concreteness, we will work with the popular actor-critic
version of TD learning (Sutton and Barto 1998). The actor-critic model
separates the algorithm into two parts, which map well onto separable com-
ponents of neural activity. This section sets out a simplified version of the
actor-critic model. We will see that, in common with other TD learning al-
gorithms, the actor-critic model presupposes that the RPE has meta-level
content: it represents (non-conceptually) that the current feedback differs
from the system’s representation of expected value, and by how much, and
directs that the value representation to be adjusted accordingly.
In the actor-critic model one system, the actor, follows a ‘policy’ that
selects actions based on the average payoff associated with each available
option ( in the box in the top left of Fig. 1). The policy makes a choice
probabilistically, with a proportionately higher chance of chossing options
represented as proportionately more valuable. Another system, the critic,
makes use of the predicted value of the chosen action. Because of the element
of chance in the action selection policy, the expected value of the chosen
action may be high or low. The critic compares the expected value with the
outcome actually received from the chosen action. The difference between
these values is the RPE. The RPE signal is used by the critic to update
the prediction associated with the chosen action for the future. Then we
return to the first step: that updated value is used by the actor, together with
predicted values for the other available options, as the basis for selecting the
next action.
The RPE signal is generated by midbrain neurons in the VTA and sub-
stantia nigra pars compacta. Phasic changes in the dopamine released at
their terminal projections in the ventral striatum modulate synaptic plastic-
ity in such a way that the predicted rewards represented in the striatum are
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modulated, increasing or decreasing the predicted reward associated with the
just-chosen option in accordance with the RPE signal. The adjacent dorsal
striatum is thought to implement the actor, selecting actions on the basis of
the ventral striatum’s predictions (Daw et al. 2006; O’Doherty et al. 2004).
We will work with simplified version of the actor-critic model, that as-
sumes that rewards are immediate. We can take it that the neuroscience has
established how the various components are connected together, how the ac-
tivity of each is dependent on the activity of other components, and how the
system is connected to actions in the world and feedback from the world. So
we will assume that the wiring diagram in Figure 1 is a correct description of
the neural system. That system can be described in terms of its non-contentful
properties, saying how firing rates in each component depend on the others,
lead to action, and depend on feedback; and saying how those connections
are modulated. When the system is embedded in a problem space, receiving
feedback from the external world for real actions performed on the world,
then we can also describe it as performing computations over representations
about the world. Parameters in the computational model describe how com-
ponents in the system relate to items in the world (actions, rewards). These
are further real, relational properties of components of the neural circuit
(e.g. how neural firing in one internal component covaries with the volume
of juice delivered). The system performs an algorithm over components with
these relational properties. As an implementation of a computational model
the various components of the system have putative correctness conditions or
satisfaction conditions when they are in certain states. Those are the contents
presupposed by the model.
The computational model plus details of its putative neural implementa-
tion constitutes a hypothesis about how quantities described by the model
are realised in distributed patterns of neural firing it the brain, and how
learning is realised by synaptic plasticity. What do these putative contents
add to a purely non-contentful, neural description of how the system op-
erates? They allow us to explain the operation of the system in terms of
properties that connect, explanatorily, with aspects of the environment to
which the system is receptive and on which it acts. Those contents are more
than merely instrumentally justified if they do indeed capture real relational
properties of the system (content in these kinds of systems being a certain
kind of complex relational property). In this section I will simply set out the
contents presupposed by the actor-critic model. The predictive success of the
model is a prima facie reason to accept the putative contents it attributes.
The rest of the paper aims to test that prima facie case.
Consider just two actions, action 1 and action 2 (e.g. left and right button
presses), where probabilistic rewards depend only on which action is chosen
and are not conditional on any other stimulus or contextual feature. The
critic keeps a model-free representation of the reward that will be received on
average for performing each action: V1 and V2. The actor uses these values as
input to a policy  that chooses an action to perform probabilistically, with
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the probability that a given action is selected increasing as its expected value
increases relative to other available actions.3 Once the action is executed
the critic receives feedback in the form of a reward of some magnitude
r (including zero), which it uses to calculate a prediction error and then
update the value for the chosen action. The value is moved in the direction
of the feedback actually received by adding a proportion of the RPE. The
proportion is given by the learning rate α. α accordingly determines how
quickly the predicted reward is adjusted in the direction of the most recent
feedback. So the representations involved are:
Expected value of action 1 V1
Expected value of action 2 V2
Chosen action Ai (either A1 or A2)
Reward received r
Prediction error (having chosen Ai) δ = r − Vi
Learning rate α
Updated expected values:
Chosen action Ai Vi → Vi + αδ
Unchosen action Aj Vj → Vj
These putative representations are realised by patterns of neural firing
in the brain areas described above. According to the computational model
these vehicles have the following contents. r represents the reward actually
received in the current time step. The chosen action is represented by A1
or A2, respectively. These representations are tightly connected to outputs:
representation A1 reliably causes action 1 to be performed and that is part
of its function. So the model treats the Ai as having directive or imperative
content: do action i. It may also be that they are relied on in updating
expected values, to tell the system which action was chosen. If so, they also
have indicative content: action i was chosen.
V1 and V2 predict the reward that would be obtained on average if action
1 or 2 were repeatedly selected in the current environment. (Without loss
of generality we focus on V1.) That is, the content is an expectation in the
probabilistic sense of expectation (probability x magnitude): on average the
reward for selecting action 1 will be V1.4 The claim that the system represents
an expectation can sound metarepresentational in its own right, before we
even reach the RPE. But that is a play on the word ‘expectation’. Here the
expectation value is a represented objective quantity (objective probability
of reward times its magnitude). V1 is the agent’s current best estimate of
that value. We can put this in terms of the veridicality conditions for V1.
According to the model, V1 is accurate iff the average reward payoff that
would be achieved by repeatedly choosing action 1 in the current environment
is V1. The pattern of behaviour driven by V1 will work best for the system
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only if V1 is accurate in that sense. If the average reward that would be
obtained by repeatedly choosing action 1 is actually higher than V1, then
the agent’s behaviour will be suboptimal in that the system will chose action
1 less than it should; conversely if V1 overestimates the average reward that
would be obtained the system will choose action 1 too often.
The RPE, δ, is used to update the reward prediction for the type of ac-
tion that was just chosen. It indicates that the reward received was higher
or lower than the predicted value and directs that the predicted value be
adjusted accordingly. So the model presupposes that the indicative content
of δ is: the reward received for the last action was δ higher/lower than currently-
represented expectation for that action. δ then has the function of updating
the corresponding representation of expected value. So the model also pre-
supposes an imperative content for δ: increase/decrease the predicted value Vi
in proportion to the magnitude of δ. These indicative and imperative clauses
are, at this stage, simply descriptions of the content that is presupposed by
the model. The indicative content describes the condition under which the
RPE signal would be accurate, according to the model. The imperative con-
tent describes the condition under which downstream processing would have
responded appropriately to the RPE signal; that is, it states a satisfaction
condition that the model presupposes δ to have. Although it is not remarked
upon at all in the reinforcement learning literature, representational proper-
ties figure in both the correctness condition and the satisfaction condition
attributed to δ. That makes δ metarepresentational.
The presupposition that the RPE has metarepresentational content makes
intuitive sense in the context of the model. δ closely correlates with the differ-
ence between expected value and reward (because that is how it is calculated).
And it is relied on in subsequent processing for that correlation, not for any
further information it carries about things in the world. By way of analogy,
consider two ways that I might update my beliefs about the temperature out-
side. Suppose I read 16◦C on the slightly unreliable thermometer outside the
window. If a friend then tells me it is 20◦C outside, I will revise my estimate
based on both sources of evidence, perhaps to an average of 18◦C. If instead
of telling me about the weather, she tells me about the thermometer—that it
under-reads by 2◦C—then I would also revise my estimate to 18◦C. In the
first case I am relying on my friend for some evidence she has about
the world and forming a conclusion based on both sources of evidence.
In the second case I am relying on her for some evidence about the accuracy
of my first estimate, and revising that estimate accordingly. The RPE δ is used
in the second way—for the content it carries about the degree of inaccuracy
of the previous estimate.
4. How to Deflate a Metarepresentational Reading
Although the metarepresentational status of RPEs is very little discussed,
there is a large literature on ‘metacognition’ in other animals—the central
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issue being whether representations with meta-level contents are involved in
performing various tasks. That makes it a useful place to look for arguments
that test the prima facie case that RPEs are metarepresentational. In the ab-
sence of language it is hard to tell if an animal has any representational states
with meta-level contents. I follow the practice of using the term ‘metacogni-
tion’ to cover all tasks that involve some kind of self-monitoring, irrespective
of whether metarepresentation is involved.
Two distinctions should be noted at the outset. First, meta-‘cognitive’
could suggest a contrast between the cognitive and the perceptual, affective
or motoric, so perhaps also a limitation to conceptual representations with
constituent structure, built up out of concepts. In fact the literature is not
restricted in that way. Many of the representations at issue, with putatively
meta-level contents, are non-conceptual representations with no constituent
structure. Nor need they be cognitive in any other narrow sense. They may
include perceptual representations, motor programs and low-level represen-
tations in subpersonal systems. Any representations at the psychological level
(personal or subpersonal)—i.e. that figure in a realist information processing
explanation of behaviour—are candidates.
The second distinction is between the content and control senses of
metacognition. Some call all representations or processes which supervise
or monitor some other mental process ‘metacognitive’ (Carruthers 2009,
p. 170). But it is of course a substantive question whether, in giving an infor-
mation processing account of some process that depends upon monitoring
other processes, we should appeal to metarepresentational contents. For ex-
ample, a robot is capable of monitoring whether it is continuing to make
forward progress and, if not, initiating a movement in another direction.
That kind of self-monitoring clearly does not require metarepresentation,
but could be considered to fall within the ‘control’ sense of metacognition
(Carruthers 2009: 129). Our focus is on metacognition in the content, not
just the control sense: on representations whose content concerns the content
of another representation.
Optimal performance in a typical metacognition experiment requires the
animal to keep track of its own chance of success in some object-level
task. For example, in (Hampton 2001) macaque monkeys were trained to
remember a visual stimulus, and then tested on whether they could pick
out that stimulus from an array of four different pictures some minutes
later, with a food reward for getting it right. The monkeys were some-
times given the option, shortly before taking the memory test, of opt-
ing out for a sure-fire but lesser reward. If they opted to take the mem-
ory test they would get a peanut (favoured) for correct answers, otherwise
nothing. If they opted out they were sure to get a reward, but only an
un-exciting pellet of monkey chow. The optimal behaviour would be to
opt out of the test on those occasions where, because its memory was
poor, the monkey would be unlikely to get the right answer if took the
test.
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Naturally the memory test becomes more difficult as the delay between
initial stimulus and test increases (up to 4 minutes). Both of Hampton’s mon-
keys opted out more at longer delays. However, that could reflect learning a
general rule that the probability of getting it right tends to be lower at longer
delays. The crucial question is whether, at a given delay duration, the animal
is sensitive to trial-by-trial variations in the strength of its memory of the
initial stimulus. One of the two monkeys did distinguish, at a given delay,
between trials in which it was likely to succeed and those in which it was
likely to fail, evidenced by the fact that it was more likely to be correct in
trials where it was given the choice and opted in, than in those trials (33%)
where it was forced to take the test. Of course, there could be a general accu-
racy cost to being forced to take the test (e.g. because these trials are rarer,
or because the forced-choice situation is more stressful). But that cost should
be the same at each delay duration, whereas Hampton’s first monkey derived
an increasing benefit from opting out as the delay increased. Its chance of
succeeding in the opt-in condition remained relatively constant at increased
delays while its chance of succeeding in the forced choice condition grew
progressively worse. This was an important result because it provided good
evidence that a macaque monkey could make an opt-out decision based on
a purely internal indicator of its own chance of success: the strength of its
memory of the stimulus, or some correlate thereof.
Understandably, comparative psychology has focused on establishing
whether these kinds of tasks are being solved in reliance on an internal
cue or merely an external cue. But interestingly, that issue does not deter-
mine the metarepresentation question, in either direction. An internal cue
may be relied on in processing simply for the information it carries about the
world (e.g. internal cues about where the edges are in a visual scene are relied
upon for information about where the objects are). And an external cue may
be relied upon for information that it carries about the accuracy of the ani-
mal’s own representational states. For example, the animal’s own behaviour
in vacillating between two options is an externally observable cue. But if the
animal reacts to this information, not simply by acting to resolve the response
conflict, but by doing something epistemic like gathering more information
before deciding, then it may be relying on the externally-observable cue for
information it carries about the animal’s own representational states.
Conflating metarepresentation with reliance on an inner resource will
make it seem as if any hierarchical information processing system involves
metarepresentations. Consider a feedforward set up in which layer 1 of a sys-
tem represents the spatial distribution of visual contrast and layer 2 uses that
information to calculate the location of edges. Does the fact that layer 2 is
wholly reliant on an internal resource, namely the output of layer 1, thereby
make activation in layer 2 metarepresentational? No, because layer 2 can rely
on layer 1 for the information it carries about the world. Speaking metaphor-
ically, layer 2 need not be interested in the processing of layer 1 for its own
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sake—for information layer 1 carries about the system itself. By analogy, I
might ask a friend to describe an event in order to find out what went on, or
I might know what occurred and just be interested in assessing his veracity.
Only in the latter case need I metarepresent the information he conveys. In
the former case I could simply take him to be an instrument that carries in-
formation about the event. Typically models that involve hierarchical layers
of information-processing filters (Marr 1982) are not metarepresentational
because, although each layer after the first is wholly reliant on an internal
resource, those internal resources are relied on for the information they carry
about external features.
In an experiment similar to Hampton (2001), Kiani and Shadlen recorded
directly from neurons in the macaque brain that seemed to be causally rel-
evant to the animal’s decision to opt out of a two-alternative perceptual
decision test. They interpreted these neurons as representing the monkey’s
confidence in the accuracy of its first-order perceptual judgement (Kiani
and Shadlen 2009). But a rival first-order explanation is available, which
nicely illustrates the thorniest issue in metacognition experiments. Kiani and
Shadlen found neurons in area LIP for which a high firing rate predicted
opting to make a perceptual judgement, and an intermediate firing rate pre-
dicted choosing the opt-out option. The trouble with their interpretation is
that these neurons could equally well be representing the expected value of
the target option (reward magnitude x probability) relative to the other op-
tions. Rather than representing its own confidence in a particular perceptual
judgement, the system could simply be keeping track of the expected value of
all three options, two of which deliver high rewards probabilistically and the
third of which delivers a low reward with certainty. The monkey can learn
by reinforcement that when the noise in its representation of the perceptual
stimulus is high, it is less likely to be rewarded for its subsequent perceptual
judgement. In those circumstances the opt-out option will be have the high-
est expected value, so the monkey will choose that one. In fact, for much of
the paper Kiani and Shadlen treat this neural population as representing the
‘accumulation of evidence in favour of one or the other option’ (p. 761) or
the ‘expected chance of success’ (p. 762). It is only in the discussion section
that they describe this as a representation of certainty, but without offering
a good reason to distinguish certainty from expected value (p. 763).
That line of reasoning exemplifies the basic challenge to meta-level ex-
planations of self-monitoring experiments. Peter Carruthers makes similar
claims about all the different experiments which purport to show metarep-
resentation in other animals. Whether the argument successfully undercuts a
metarepresentational conclusion varies from experiment to experiment, but
our focus is its basic structure. The tactic is to argue that keeping track of the
probability of various rewards, together with subtle calculations over first-
order expected values (reward value x probability), is adequate to explain
behaviour.5
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For example, Carruthers takes on an argument made by Davidson
that surprise is necessarily metarepresentational (Carruthers 2008: 61–63;
Davidson 2001: 104–05). Carruthers says that a feeling of surprise can be
generated simply by a clash between first order representations, without
thereby being second order. You may believe not-p and then see that p, the
contradiction occasioning surprise, without thinking about your own mental
states or metarepresenting their contents in any way. As a matter of exegesis,
Carruthers’ argument does not succeed as a refutation of Davidson, since
Davidson was drawing a distinction between being surprised and being star-
tled, indicating that he meant surprise to cover only some of the cases: ‘Sur-
prise involves a further step. . . . Surprise requires that I be aware of a contrast
between what I did believe and what I come to believe’ (p. 104). It is surprise
in that sense that Davidson claims entails having beliefs about beliefs—which
is plausible, given the way he sets up his terms. But, Davidson interpretation
aside, Carruthers is right that the basic phenomenon of reacting to a contra-
diction between representational states need not involve metarepresentation.
Carruthers relies on these kinds of considerations to argue against Joe¨lle
Proust’s claim that some ‘epistemic feelings’ are metacognitive.
Proust and Carruthers on Metacognitive Feelings
Proust has developed a sophisticated account of ‘metacognitive feelings’ and
associated phenomena (Proust 2003, 2007, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2010). These
states are more low-level in several respects than thoughts or cognitions.
Centrally for our purposes they are non-conceptual representations. Proust
points to bodily changes and reactions occasioned by uncertainty, response
conflict or surprise. An animal might use these reactions as cues to act so
as to improve its information, or to opt out of the current situation so as to
make new choices available. We humans make similar uses of these ‘epistemic
feelings’. Proust argues that they are non-conceptual representations but are
not meta-representational, having instead a special kind of functional role
intermediate between object-level and meta-level representations, involving
the control of object-level representational states.
Carruthers claims that animals making use of such feelings as cues might
thereby be capable of passing any of the tests of metacognition yet devised
in comparative psychology, but would be ‘wholly incapable of metacogni-
tion in the metarepresentational sense’ (2009, p. 171). Carruthers accepts
that such states carry information about other internal states, in the purely
correlational sense (Shannon 1949), but rightly objects that mere correla-
tions are insufficient for representation. For example, the feeling of fear may
be a reliable consequence of the thought that something is dangerous, so
carries the information that such a thought has occurred (Carruthers 2008,
p. 62). But if correlational connections between representations were suffi-
cient, metarepresentation would be absolutely ubiquitous. General reasons
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for rejecting purely information-based accounts of content (Fodor 1987;
Millikan 1990) apply with equal force here.
Several authors argue that, amongst all the profusion of correlational
information carried by any representation, the way to home in on content
is to look at the way that the representation is acted on or ‘consumed’ in
downstream processing (Godfrey-Smith 2006; Millikan 1984; Papineau 1987;
Shea 2007). Carruthers offers that kind of criterion for deciding whether a
putative representation, which carries correlational information about an-
other representation, is in fact metarepresentational:
‘purely informational accounts of intentional content face notorious difficul-
ties . . . . And then the question for us becomes: Does the animal make use of the
epistemic feelings in question in such a way that the feeling is thereby constituted
as a nonconceptual representation of a cognitive state?’ (2009, p. 171; emphasis
in original)
‘It seems that a nonconceptual representation of some property of the world
represents what it does partly in virtue of its role in guiding thought and action
that is focused on that aspect of the world.’ (2009, p. 171)
We can apply Carruthers’ test to the LIP signal recorded by Kiani and
Shadlen. It carries correlational information about the world (how likely it
is that the monkey will be rewarded if it chooses an option) and about the
monkey’s representations (how accurate its representation of the stimulus is).
How does the system make use of this resource? If the signal ramps up only
slowly, the animal chooses the opt-out option, thereby increasing the average
reward delivered. This way of using the LIP signal seems to be focused on
the world—the average reward payoff (probability x magnitude) associated
with various options—and not the accuracy of the monkey’s object-level
representations as such.
Carruthers suggests that this type of deflationary approach applies across
the board, with the consequence that epistemic feelings never have meta-level
contents. In response Proust makes a strong case that some epistemic feelings
play a genuinely metacognitive role that cannot be fully captured in terms of
ordinary first-order contents (they ‘concern’, but do not metarepresent, the
content of other thoughts, according to Proust). Our focus is not on resolving
that debate, but on whether the deflationary tactic identified by Carruthers
applies to the RPEs involved in reward-guided decision making.
5. A Deflationary Treatment of RPEs?
5.1 Dispensing with prediction errors
This section sets out the evidence that RPEs have genuinely metarepre-
sentational content. 5.1 gives the evidence against an account of reward-
guided behaviour that dispenses with prediction errors entirely. 5.2 applies the
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Carruthers test to the RPE signal and argues that the way it is made use
of is ‘focused on’ the information it carries about another of the system’s
representational states. 5.3 shows that alternative first-order contents are not
compatible with the way correctness/incorrectness of the RPE signal is used
to explain the system’s behaviour. And 5.4 briefly assesses how far these
kinds of considerations apply to other kinds of system.
Here is how the task could be solved without calculating a prediction
error. Recall that reinforcement learning models posit a system that keeps a
tally of the expected reward for each action (the chance of success multiplied
by the value of the reward), adjusts that tally on the basis of feedback, and
uses it as input to a stochastic decision rule in which the action with the
highest relative value is more likely to be selected. The updating algorithm is
as follows (having chosen action 1):
V1 → V1 + αδ = V1 + α(r − V1) [δ = r − V1]
Rearranging:
V1 → (1−α)V1+αr (1)
So the expected value is reset to a weighted average of the current feedback
and the old cumulative expected value. The relative weight to be attached to
the latest feedback is determined by the learning rate parameter α—the lower
α, the more the next choice will be affected by the rewards received deep in
the reward history of that action.6 That algorithm could be implemented
without relying on a prediction error signal. The new value of the expected
reward is calculated in an operation that takes as input the expected value,
reward feedback and learning rate, and outputs a new expected value as
a result (a linear operator algorithm: Bush and Mosteller 1951). The RPE
quantity, which was our candidate for meta-level content, has dropped out
of the calculation entirely.7
That way of solving the task would be behaviourally equivalent to the
actor-critic algorithm in the tasks I have considered so far. Therefore this
task can be solved first order, using an algorithm that does not depend on
an RPE. However, suspending the simplification introduced in section 2, in
some tasks agents have to make a number of choices in series before they
achieve an eventual reward. We saw above that temporal difference learning
algorithms, which do rely on an RPE, provide an optimal way of solving
this credit-assignment problem. A linear operator algorithm that simply re-
weights expected values in proportion to feedback is not suited to such tasks
(see Appendix).
Furthermore, we are not restricted to behavioural evidence about which
algorithm subjects are using. Neural evidence can identify putative repre-
sentations in terms of their functional profile: which internal and external
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parameters they correlate with most closely. The question of which model
best fits the pattern of neural evidence can be assessed without presupposing
that quantities calculated over in the model carry any particular content.
And the evidence is very strong that a signal carried by dopamine neurons
projecting from the VTA and substantia nigra pars compacta to the ven-
tra striatum is causally involved in choice behaviour. Its functional profile
corresponds closely to the RPE quantity in the model. Interestingly, this is a
case where, in addition to neurophysiological recording in animals, the strat-
egy of model-based analysis of fMRI data, recently on the rise in cognitive
neuroscience, is able to take us beyond the kinds of inferences about internal
variables that could be made using either the behavioral data of cognitive
psychology or the standard subtractive FMRI methods (Corrado et al. 2009;
Mars et al. 2010). In short, many different lines of evidence now lend strong
weight to the conclusion that an RPE signal is causally involved in generating
the patterns of behaviour observed in these experiments.
Proust points out that externally-available information about the pattern
of choices is sufficient to calculate choice behaviour. An objective observer
can keep track of the agent’s success rate just as the agent himself does, on the
basis of actions performed and feedback delivered (Proust 2007, p. 283). That
is right, but we saw above that information being externally available does not
determine the question of what is being represented using that information.
The evidence from neuroscience and computational modelling amounts to
a compelling case that externally available evidence is used in a series of
internally-implemented calculations, one stage of which involves an RPE
signal (that is, its non-contentful correlational profile corresponds closely to
the RPE quantity in the model). The fact that the standard interpretation
of the algorithm presupposes that the RPE signal carries meta-level content
completes the prima facie case for metarepresentation.
5.2 What is use of the RPE focused on?
So there is strong evidence that model-free reward-guided decision making
is achieved in many species using an algorithm which, like our simplified
version, relies on an RPE signal. Here I assess the presupposition that the
RPE signal meta-represents, adopting Carruthers’ suggestion that we look
at how it is made use of in downstream processing, in particular asking with
Carruthers whether those uses are focused on an aspect of the world.
When a state correlates with one property it usually correlates with many.
For example, the needle on a car fuel gauge covaries with the volume of fuel
in the tank; but also with the mass of fuel in the tank, the height of fuel in
the tank, the pressure exerted on the electromagnetic sensor in the tank, the
current flowing in the wire leading to the gauge, and so on. The RPE signal
too carries correlational information about many things. Precisely what it
correlates with will depend upon the details of the experimental set up. For
example, in a task in which the environment is very unstable, with frequent
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changes in the payoff probabilities attached to each option, rewards will be
unpredictable, keeping predicted rewards Vi low. So an RPE signal will tend
to be produced by every delivery of reward. That is, the RPE will correlate
with the reward just delivered, and to some extent with the expected reward
(magnitude x probability) for the just-chosen option.
In a stable environment in which some options are consistently rewarded
with high probability, most feedback will be fully predicted, so most RPE
signals will be small. The few large negative RPE signals will be caused by
occasional omitted rewards. Large positive RPE signals will be even less
frequent, requiring that on one of the rare occasions when the system selects
the low value option, it is also by chance unexpectedly rewarded. So in these
circumstances the RPE is inversely correlated with the system’s stable reward
expectation for the chosen option.
In the midst of these and all the other types of correlational information
carried by the RPE signal, which information is being made use of in down-
stream processing? How do we answer Carruthers’ question: is the way the
RPE signal is used to guide thought and action directed on some aspect of
the world, or is its use directed on the creature’s own representational states?
Let’s pin down the question a bit. Godfrey-Smith (2006) argues that the
use of a representation by some other system (the ‘consumer’) is an essen-
tial part of the ‘basic representationalist model’. The consumer takes the
representation to stand in for some state of the world and reacts to the
representation as it would if it were able to react to that state of the world
directly. In this way, the consumer system is making use of some relation be-
tween the representation and the world. Carrying information (correlating)
is just one of several relations between representation and world that could
be exploited by the consumer in this way.
Fred Dretske says more about consumers exploiting correlations. In chap-
ter 4 of Explaining Behaviour (Dretske 1988) he advances a theory of content
that differs from the purely informational treatment in Knowledge and the
Flow of Information (Dretske 1981). Content is based not just on informa-
tion, but on information that is used to guide learning for action. Dretske’s
theory is an account of what makes it the case that certain representations
have the content they do. Here I appeal to it only as offering plausible evi-
dential considerations, rather than as a true constitutive account. Adapting
Dretske’s framework slightly for our purposes, consider a system that learns
by instrumental conditioning. Suppose an animal can detect an external
stimulus by means of tokening an internal state B. Suppose, too, that the
animal has an action-selection system that initially responds at random to
B, producing internal state R that drives a reach to the right. If that action
is rewarded, the connection between B and R is strengthened—that is, the
chance increases that R will be produced when B is tokened (see Fig. 2).
Internal state B carries correlational information about many things: the
identity of the stimulus, properties of the stimulus like colour and shape,
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Figure 2. Content from Instrumental Conditioning (following Dretske 1988)
and all the other worldly properties with which the stimulus correlates—a
whole series of properties F, F′, . . . . 8 These are not restricted to properties
of the stimulus. For example, and crucially for our purposes, internal state
B correlates with there being a peanut on the right (because the external
stimulus driving B is so-correlated).
Now our question: is the way B is used to drive thought and action
directed on F, or F′, or . . . ? In producing response R, which aspect of the
correlational information carried by B is being made use of? Dretske’s tactic
is to focus on the condition in virtue of which response R is rewarded. Some
consequence of response R was registered by the system as rewarding (the
animal’s ingesting a peanut), and the B→R connection was strengthened
as a result. Assuming that R’s being rewarded is somewhat specific to the
circumstances when the stimulus is present, one of the features with which
the stimulus correlates, and hence B correlates, is responsible for the response
R being rewarding; namely there being a peanut on the right. Call that fact
G. B’s correlating with G explains B’s being connected with motor state R,
hence with reaching to the right. G, then, is the piece of B’s correlational
information that is also representational—use of B can be said to be directed
on G.
For example, in Fig. 2, B correlates both with there is a dark grey stimulus
and there is a peanut on the right. When the animal responds to B by looking
right and finds the result rewarding, it is there being a peanut on the right,
rather than the colour of the stimulus, which acts as the primary reinforcer.
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So it is in virtue of the correlation between B and peanuts on the right (G)
that the B→R connection was established. In sum, this is the evidential test
I take from Dretske: which aspect of the correlational information carried
by a putative representation explains the fact that it is wired up to behaviour
in the way it is?
We can apply this reasoning to the RPE signal δ. It is not wired up directly
to behaviour as in Dretske’s model, but we can still ask which correlational
information explains the fact that it is processed as it is to issue in behaviour.
We saw above that δ correlates with many external-world properties, and
also with an internal property: the difference between expected value and
feedback, as relied on by the actor-critic model. How is the RPE signal used
to guide subsequent information processing and action? It is used to adjust
the expected value of the just-chosen action, the updated value of which is
then used in selecting the next behaviour. Applying the Dretske test (inspired
by the Carruthers quote), we ask: which correlation explains the fact that the
system is set up to process and then act on δ in that way? The computational
modelling results show that the overall system is an optimal way for an agent
to harvest maximal rewards in a certain range of environments (Sutton and
Barto 1998). So we can suppose that the system has been set up by evolution
and/or learning to maximise the overall delivery of reward to the agent.
The represented expected value V1 of the just-chosen action (supposing it
was action 1) is increased if action 1 was more rewarding than represented,
and V1 is decreased if the feedback was less than represented; in both cases
by a quantity proportional to the difference between represented expectation
and reward. The way the Vi feed into the decision policy means that, when V1
is set higher, the actor will choose action 1 more often than before. According
to the optimality conditions proved in the reinforcement learning literature
(Sutton and Barto 1998), that change will only be beneficial on average for
the overall system if the reward received really was more than the previously-
represented expected reward from action 1. Otherwise the adjustment would
tend to reduce long run payoffs. Correlatively, when V1 is adjusted to be
lower, the actor will choose action 1 less often than before. That change
will only be beneficial to the system on average if the reward received really
was lower than the previously-represented expected reward from action 1.
So the way that δ is acted upon—to revise the represented expected values
Vi—is beneficial to the system in virtue of the tight correlation between δ,
on the one hand, and the difference between represented expected value and
feedback, on the other.
Of course δ also correlates with the difference between the current feed-
back and the (worldly) objective expected reward for that option (i.e. its
objective chance of being rewarded times the reward magnitude). But the
fact that the current feedback differs from the chance x magnitude for op-
tion i does not by itself rationalise changing the estimate of expected reward
Vi or of the resultant change to the action policy, to select action i more
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frequently. The feedback on a particular trial will rarely match the actual
expected reward (objective chance x magnitude) even if the expected value
is correctly represented. The feedback’s differing from the objective expected
value is fully compatible with the represented expected value being correct.
And unless the system is representing that the current estimate of expected
reward is actually incorrect, there is no rationale for changing the estimate
or the action policy.
We are supposing that the system has been set up the way that it is, by evo-
lution or learning, in order to maximise overall average payoffs to the agent.
It is the correlational information carried by δ about difference between rep-
resented expectation and feedback that contributes to achieving this overall
outcome. So that correlation explains why δ is wired up to be processed
in the way that it is. Applying the Dretske-inspired test, that is evidence
that δ is representing that the reward was more/less than the represented
expected value and telling downstream processing to revise expected values
accordingly—which is the content presupposed by the cognitive neurosci-
entific explanation (section 3). That content partly concerns the content of
another of the system’s representations (Vi), and so is metarepresentational.
Carruthers considers the possibility that the forms of behaviour elicited in
experiments on animal metacognition might be generated by non-conceptual
metarepresentations; and rejects it (2009, p. 170–1). Although elsewhere he
suggests that metarepresentation requires concepts of mental states (2008,
p. 58; and indeed 2009, p. 171, last para.)—which would entirely rule out
non-conceptual metarepresentations in animals lacking concepts of repre-
sentational properties—in the passage at (2009, pp. 170–1) he rejects non-
conceptual metarepresentation for a different reason. He applies the test we
relied on above and concludes that the use made of the non-conceptual rep-
resentations in question in these animals is ‘aimed at answering a first-order
question about the object—“Is it edible?”, “Is it safe?”, “What comes next?”,
and so on—rather than being aimed at changing the animal’s own degrees
of belief ’ (2009, p. 171). Applying that test to δ, the use made of it is aimed
at changing the agent’s own representational states. So δ has non-conceptual
meta-level content of the kind that Carruthers explicitly rejects in the case
of animal metacognition. (Given his other commitments, it is likely that
Carruthers would want to resist the conclusion that a representation with
meta-level content, even of a non-conceptual variety, is involved in low-level
reward-guided decision-making.)
Proust argues that behaviour in animal metacognition tasks is driven by
non-conceptual representations, but does not think they are metarepresenta-
tional (Proust 2007, 2009b; pace Carruthers 2009, p. 170). Proust develops
a subtle view according to which metacognition is neither first-order nor
second-order (Proust 2007, p. 287). The non-conceptual representations in-
volved are driven by other representations, but rely on properties of the
vehicles of those representations like the strength of a trace (Proust 2003:
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352). The states they are about are indeed representations, but their contents
only concern non-representational properties of those states (Proust 2010:
996). So Proust would reject the kind of metarepresentation at issue here,
in which a representational property of another representation figures in its
non-conceptual content.
If the theory Proust has developed to account for animal metacognition
were applied to the RPE signal, then the content of δ would concern only
non-representational properties of the vehicles of the other representations
to which it is connected (expected values Vi and reward feedback r). Such
vehicle properties are indeed further properties with which δ correlates. If
Vi and r are coded by firing rates, then δ correlates with the difference
between those firing rates. However, applying the Dretske-inspired test relied
on above, the correlation with firing rates is not the most direct explanation
of why δ is acted on in downstream processing as it is. Relying on such a
correlation would only make sense because there happens to be a further
correlation between it and a relevant contentful property. The correlation
with a representational property of Vi—that its content fails to match the
current feedback—offers of more direct explanation of the fact that δ is
processed as it is.
In short, the considerations relied on here suggest that the RPE has
content that would count as metarepresentational on Proust’s view, and also
on Carruthers view when he is not tying metarepresentation constitutively to
the possession of concepts; and both reject the idea that metarepresentations
of this kind are involved in animal metacognition.
5.3 Alternative explanations—worldly correlates
We noted above that δ also correlates with many external properties. Could it
be argued that it is by making use of the RPE’s correlation with some external
property that the system manages to harvest rewards optimally? Carruthers’
deflationary tactic was to replace (meta-) representations of confidence with
first-order representations of probability of reward. In this section we will
consider that potential worldly correlate of δ and others, and see that none
satisfactorily explains how δ contributes to the system’s performing its task.
Consider whether δ represents the likely average payoff (probability x
magnitude) for the previously selected action. We saw above that δ does
indeed carry some correlational information about the expected value of
the last action (action 1, say), especially in an unstable environment. If
that was the correlation being used, then there should be nothing wrong
with producing a large positive RPE signal in response to receiving a large
reward for action 1, even if that reward were fully predicted by V1. However,
we know that to do so would lead to adverse consequences for the agent.
The system would then select action 1 even more often, which would be a
suboptimal response. It would stop the agent exploring action 2 often enough
to learn that the reward contingencies have changed when they do. A similar
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argument undermines the idea that δ is made use of for its correlation directly
with the reward that is received.
In fact, a prominent theory of drug addiction is that this is precisely what
is going wrong in addicts’ reward system (Hyman 2005). Even though the
rewards from an action are fully predicted, a false RPE signal is generated
by the direct action of the drug on the dopamine system, leading reward
expectations to be revised ever upwards, far beyond the actual levels of
reward received. If that is right, making δ a more direct correlate of the
reward value of the chosen option, rather than reward prediction error, leads
to pathological behaviour.
What about an imperative content for δ: perform the most recent action,
or for negative values: do not perform the most recent action. The trouble
with this putative content is that the connection between δ and the next
action is not very tight, nor should it be. If action 1 has a low expected
value V1, is chosen (because of the role of chance in the decision rule), and
then rewarded, a large positive δ will result. But the expected value V2 of
the other action may still be much higher, making it much more likely that
action 2 will be chosen next (as it should be). Similarly for large negative
δ—the action may still be likely to be chosen again, if starting from a high
expected rewarded relative to the other option. The RPE does not directly
dictate the chances of choosing an option, but only increases or decreases
those chances, relative to their previous level. (Furthermore, in both cases the
extent of the change is also modulated by the learning rate α). If the strength
of the connection between δ and action selection were to be increased so
that the chance of performing the next action was directly dictated by the
magnitude of δ, then the agent would perform less well because the system
would no longer be able to take account of reward history, but would only be
able to take the most recent feedback into account when calculating what to
do. That is a suboptimal strategy in all but the most radically stochastically
variable environments. So direct object-level imperative contents about action
are not appropriate contents to capture the information processing role of δ.
This discussion suggests an intuitive test as to which correlation is being
made use of by the system: is it a correlation the strengthening of which
would lead to greater overall benefits for the system? Would its weakening
reduce the benefits obtained by the system? If a stimulus is being consumed
as a probabilistic sign of a predator, and that probabilistic correlation is
strengthened, then the agent will benefit.9 My suggestion is that we hold
fixed how all the other components of the system are disposed to interact
with each other and with the outside world (at input and output). Then we
select the correlations into which δ enters and consider what would hap-
pen if that correlation were strengthened or weakened. The correlation (or
correlations) whose strengthening would most directly increase the kind of
benefit for the agent which the system has been designed to achieve (by
evolution or learning) is a good candidate for the content of δ. The same
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test applies, mutatis mutandis, for weakening a correlation. In each case this
test furnishes good evidence about the content of δ, which is correspond-
ingly stronger if the same correlation shows up in both directions. Given
the use that is in fact made of δ in downstream information processing, and
the optimality results in the literature on reinforcement/temporal-difference
learning, the correlation whose strengthening will be most beneficial to the
agent is the correlation between δ on the one hand, and the difference be-
tween feedback and expected value on the other.
The other broad tactic for explaining apparent metacognitive performance
first order is to see it as the result of some form of response conflict (Hampton
2009). There need be no response conflict involved in these reward-guided
decision making tasks. One option may be consistently more likely to be
rewarded than the other options. Nevertheless, rewards that are unexpectedly
delivered or omitted continue to produce RPE signals, which are in turn used
to update reward expectations in a way that affects choice behaviour. So an
explanation in terms of response conflict is unlikely to succeed.
In sum, if the midbrain dopamine RPE signal is part of the implemen-
tation of an actor-critic reinforcement learning algorithm, and we use the
Carruthers/Dretske approach as an evidential test for what the signal
represents, then we have good evidence that the RPE does indeed have
metarepresentational content. Leading alternative accounts of the informa-
tion processing involved in these tasks, including those that are plausibly
first-order, are less well supported by behavioural data, or neural data, or
both.
5.4 Contrast cases
How much further does this argument extend? Do the kinds of evidential
considerations we have been relying on in the case of RPEs also apply to
other kinds of information processing system? Does it follow that metarep-
resentation arises in every comparator circuit? Here I offer, briefly and more
tentatively, some thoughts on the potential for the argument above to gener-
alise to other cases.
The argument does not apply to the well-known Ernst and Banks com-
parator mechanism. This mechanism combines two sources of information
about a stimulus (visual and aural, say), weighting them by the variance on
the respective channels (Ernst and Banks 2002). We argued above, in relation
to Kiani and Shadlen (2009), that the noise in a signal could be relied on
as a sign of the probability of some external world fact. The same applies
to two sources of information about a stimulus. Weighting these estimates
by variance effectively takes the variance of each to be an indicator of the
probability that the world is as that channel says it is. So it is not a case of
metarepresentation.
Nor does the argument obviously apply to a control system that com-
pares a represented target state with feedback from the world about the
agent’s progress towards reaching that state. That comparator signal may
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simply represent the fact of how the agent’s action lies in relation to a partic-
ular worldly state. If that process is taken offline, however, the case is quite
different. In some models of motor control, when a motor program is exe-
cuted it is used in parallel to produce a prediction of the outcome that will
be produced (Wolpert et al. 1995). That prediction is compared to the target
state and a prediction error signal is used to adjust the details of the motor
program being run. Such adjustments can be made before there has been time
for any sensory feedback about the result of executing the motor program.
That architecture would seem to mirror the role of the RPE. So it is plausi-
ble that such offline motor prediction errors do metarepresent—representing
the discrepancy between a target state or imperative representation and a
prediction about the state that is currently likely to be achieved, and then
being used to adjust the motor program being run as a result.
This brief overview suggests that, although the considerations we have
been pointing to might extend to some other forms of low-level information
processing, they do place substantive constraints on how widely metarepre-
sentation arises. However, on some views predictive coding is an absolutely
ubiquitous phenomenon in the brain (Friston 2010), in which case our form
of metarepresentation might be very widespread indeed. However, that rad-
ical hypothesis is by no means empirically established. If it did turn out to
be true, then the consequence that metarepresentation is ubiquitous would
fairly capture what is so surprising about the proposal.
6. Conclusion
Cognitive neuroscience promises to bring together behavioural data with
neural evidence and computational modelling so as to understand the infor-
mation processing carried out by parts of the brain. Research on probabilistic
reward-guided decision making has gone a long way towards fulfilling that
promise. Many lines of neural evidence converge on the conclusion that the
brain is making the calculations captured by one of a small family of algo-
rithms, all of which rely ineliminably on a signed prediction error signal. On
the face of it, actor-critic models take the reward prediction error signal to
have meta-level content, which is intuitive, given the way the RPE signal is
used in downstream processing to modify representations of expected value.
Deflationary approaches to metarepresentation, found in the discussion of
metacognition in other animals, do not succeed in providing a first-order
reading of the RPE signal. Indeed, one approach to representational content
proposed in the metacognition literature furnishes a positive argument that
RPEs are metarepresentational. If so, low-level non-conceptual metarepre-
sentation is much more widespread than previously thought.
Appendix: Temporal Difference Learning Algorithms
The model above makes two major simplifying assumptions. First, it as-
sumes that each trial consists of just one time-step, so it does not raise the
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problem of assigning credit to actions in a sequential task requiring a series
of correct choices to obtain a reward. Secondly, it does not make the reward
for an action conditional on a stimulus; that is, it contains no conditioned
stimulus (CS). Prediction error signals in the brain were initially discovered
by Schultz and others in a Pavlovian conditioning paradigm in which a CS
predicts an unconditioned stimulus/reward, not requiring any action to be
performed.
In the Pavlovian task each trial consists of multiple time steps. For exam-
ple, a CS might be presented at step 1 and rewarded at step 3 of a 6 step
trial (t = 1 to 6). The temporal difference learning algorithm generates, at
each time step, a prediction V(t) of the total reward that will be delivered (on
average) over the course of the rest of the trial from that time step onwards.
V(t) is conditional on the stimulus (calculated as the dot product between
a learnt weight vector and a vector representing the stimulus). The reward
expected to be delivered during a given time step t is V(t) minus V(t+1)
(except at the last time step, when it is just V(t)). The difference between
this expected value and the reward actually received during that time step
constitutes the prediction error:
δ(t) = r(t) − (V(t) − V(t+ 1))
As before, δ(t) is used to update the expected values V(t) that are carried
forward to the next trial. That is achieved by adjusting the weights by which
the stimulus vector is multiplied to arrive at V(t). For simplicity, we can treat
this as if it were a direct impact of δ(t) on V(t): V(t) is increased or decreased
in line with the value of δ(t), scaled by the learning rate α:
V(t) → V(t)+αδ(t)= V(t)+ α {r(t)− (V(t)− V(t+ 1))}
Rearranging:
V(t) → (1−α)V(t)+ αr(t)+αV(t+ 1) (2)
[Cf. equation (1) in section 5.1 (the non - TD version): V → (1 − α)V + αr]
As in our non-TD version (section 5.1), the expected value is adjusted
by giving some weight to the previous prediction and some weight to the
most recent feedback, the relative weightings determined by the learning rate
α. But in the temporal-difference version here there is an additional term:
V(t) is also adjusted by a proportion of the reward expected at the next time
step. The effect of this is to make reward expectations propagate backwards
to the earliest time step at which they are fully predicted. If an initially
unpredicted reward is delivered at step 3 then a large positive prediction
error δ(3) will be generated then, leading V(3) to be increased. If the same
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reward is delivered next time round, the prediction error δ(3) will be less,
since the reward is now partly predicted by the revised V(3). But this will
generate a prediction error at step 2, δ(2), because of the effect of V(3) (the
third term in formula (2) above), which moves V(2) in the direction of the
total reward to be delivered by the end of the trial, even though no reward
is delivered at step 2. By this means all the reward expectations before the
reward is delivered are gradually increased, starting from the time step at
which the CS predicts the reward, so that they all come to fully predict the
total reward that will be delivered, on average, by the end of a trial.
This accounts for the classic RPE signal observed in Pavlovian experi-
ments (Schultz et al. 1997; Schultz 1998). Initially a positive RPE is recorded
at the time of the reward. This gradually shifts backwards in time to the time
of the stimulus that predicts the reward, with no signal observed at the time
of reward delivery. If a predicted reward is then omitted, there is a transitory
reduction in the dopamine response at the time of the anticipated reward—a
negative RPE.
In an instrumental conditioning task, payoffs depend upon which action is
performed as well as the stimulus context. In a multi-stage instrumental task
we need to supplement the model with predictions about the value of available
actions at each time step. The credit assignment problem is overcome because
the expected value of eventual rewards propagates backwards, as we saw
above, to earlier states that predict those rewards. Those state values can
then be used to select an action that leads to a more favourable state at
the next step. A particular merit of the actor-critic model is that the same
RPE signal δ is used both (i) to update reward expectations (critic); and (ii)
to update the policy by which actions are selected at each time step based
on state values (actor). That level of complexity is omitted from the simple
model set out above, but is essential to the way the TD learning algorithm
overcomes the knotty credit assignment problem.
We saw in section 5 that our simple rule for updating expected values
based on the RPE could be reformulated to eliminate prediction errors,
becoming just a weighted average of the previous expected value and the
most recent feedback (formula (1)). The RPE can also be eliminated from
the updating of value in the TD algorithm (formula (2)), albeit with an extra
term reflecting the expected value at the next time step. We saw in section 5
that, despite the availability of a first-order calculation, there is strong neural
evidence that the RPE is in fact calculated as a separate step and relied on
in choice behaviour. Now we can see why that should be. It is because, as
well as updating reward expectations, the RPE is simultaneously used by the
actor to update the policy by which actions are chosen. The computational
efficiency of this actor-critic algorithm, with its dual role for an RPE signal
δ(t), explains why the task is not in fact solved by the first-order calculation
set out in formulas (1) and (2) above.
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Notes
1 Shea and Heyes (2010) discussed whether there is a form of metarepresentation that is
plausibly sufficient for consciousness. The RPE is not a candidate for that role.
2 I use ‘correctness’, ‘veridicality’ and ‘accuracy’ conditions interchangeably as shorthand
for the conditions that give the content of an indicative representation. (Some use ‘correctness
conditions’, or more commonly ‘truth conditions’ more narrowly, for instance reserving the
term as only applicable to conceptual contents at the personal level.)
3 E.g. using a softmax rule or drift diffusion mechanism.
4 I follow the convention of using letters both to refer to the representations involved and,
where appropriate, to pick out the quantities variably represented by those representations.
5 Another strand in Carruthers’ work is to posit additional mechanisms for dealing with
response conflict—for making a choice when there is a near tie in first order value.
6 In fact in many models there is an additional ‘decay rate’ parameter γ applied to V which
introduces a second degree of freedom, the effect of which is to allow the weightings that are
applied to V1 and r in the sum above to vary independently.
7 Eliasmith & Anderson make an analogous point about Kalman filters: although standard
versions involve a prediction error term, a mathematically equivalent formulation is available
that produces the same input-output behaviour and dispenses with the prediction error term,
instead updating via a weighted average of two sources of evidence (Eliasmith and Anderson
2003: 288–93).
8 These are not different ways of coding information, but different pieces of information
carried by the same code. For example, the brain may use a rate code and/or a phase code.
The different codings are different properties of the system’s internal states (the rate or phase
of neural firing), each of which correlates with a whole range of external properties. Suppose
firing rate makes a difference to downstream processing whereas information carried by phase
is discarded. Still, firing rate correlates with a range of properties F, F′, . . . .
9 Trade offs between misses and false positives also have to be considered (Godfrey-Smith
1991).
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